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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper examines the relationship between forced migration and the security of host
states and regions. Forced migration has always had security implications. From the
emergence of the early forced migration regime following the First World War, to its
codification after the Second World War, through the Cold War, and into the post-Cold
War era, the forced displacement of persons has always resulted in security concems for
receiving states. As such, the paper argues that policy responses have traditionally been
motivated primarily by such security concerns, with legal, humanitarian and
development considerations coming second.
Such policy responses have, in turn, been shaped by the prevailing international political
climate. During the Cold War, forced migration constituted one of the central foreign
policy concerns of US and Western foreign policies. So-called "refugee warriors"
received generous support from patron govemments as part of the logic of proxy wars.
The end of the Cold War has brought new salience to the issue, as the changing nature
of conflict, the expanding number of displaced persons and the changing priorities of
Western states affected the response to the security implications of forced migrations.
This new operational and political environment directly affected UNHCR's response to
such situations, expanding its activities to a wider array of beneficiaries and in a new
range of contexts previously understood to be beyond its mandate.
Protection failures in such operations as Rwanda and Bosnia, however, led to
disillusionment with these new responses. New conceptualisations of and responses to
the security implications of forced migration were proposed, including the notion of
'human security' and the 'ladder of options' approach. On-going multilateral
discussions on the topic highlight the enduring dissatisfaction with the new approaches,
and the continued need for an effective and comprehensive understanding of insecurity
resulting from refugee movements and other forms of forced migration.
A review of the literature on forced migration and security over the past decade reveals
similar shortcomings. Early literature in the area had a limited understanding of the
nature of security, while more recent literature remains preoccupied with the concerns
and responses of Western states and the security dimensions of mass influx situations.





in the context of protracted refugee situations, the reality
for the overwhelming majority of the world's refugees. Such situations result in both
direct security concerns stemming from the spill-over of violence and the
militaization of refugee populations 
- 
and indirect concerns 
- 
stemming from local
grievances towards assisted refugee populations and the perception of the presence of
refugees as an unending burden on the host state and community. The paper concludes
by detailing elements of a necessary response to these concerns, including the
separation of armed elements, targeted assistance to address local grievances, the
development of local capacity to ensure protection and durable solutions and the
formulation of comprehensive solutions to protracted refugee situations.
RECOMMENDATIONS TO DFID
DFID should be especially concerned with the security implications of forced
migration as it has a direct impact on well-being for both displaced persons and
host communities.
DFID's response to the security implications of forced migration must be
mindful of the causes of nature of displacement, the mixed character of refugee
camp populations, the political and military abuse of camps, the location of
refugee camps in insecure border regions, the weak rule of law in refugee camps
and the negative economic and security impact of these camps on local
communities.
DFID should understand that recent proposals to 'regionalise' asylum, through
the establishment of ozones of protectiono, will increase the burdens bome by
host states in regions of refugee origin, compound their security concerns, and
lead to increased reluctanoe to host refugees. As such, DFID should engage in
cross-departmental dialogue to ensure that its understanding of conditions in
host countries are fully communicated to Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
the Home Office and the Cabinet Office.
DFID needs to work towards a strengthened multilateral regime which has the
mandate, capacity and resources to meet current unmet refugee needs in a more
impartial and effective manner.
DFID's policy approach to refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs must include a
thorough consideration of protracted refugee situations, as such situations are
no less dangerous sources of instability and no less greater threat to well-beins
than more conventional securitv threats at a local and national level.
In the short term, DFID's programmes in host countries should include a
consideration of how directed assistance to refugee populated areas can
alleviate local feelings of grievance towards refugee populations, thereby
fostering greater local security and well-being.
DFID should examine the Firewood Project in Kenya and the range of Special
Programmes in Refugee Affected Areas inTanzatia and in other host countries
to assess what elements of these programmes may be mainstreamed into
DFIDos country programmes and replicated in other host countries.
Such analysis should recognise the double benefit of directed assistance: such
programmes can foster an environment of greater security and protection for
refugees and the local population, while also contributing to broader national
development objectives and the alleviation of poverty in refugee hosting
communities.
DFID should take leadership within the development community to formulate
and implement such development-related projects, in partnership with UNHCR,
but in recognition of UNHCR's core mandate to protect refugees and find
solutions to their plight.
DFID should consider how its involvement in security sector reform should
include training and capacity building for national security services to
implement host-state obligations as articulated by UN Security Council
resolution 1208 (1998) and Executive Committee (ExCom) Conclusion 94.
DFID should consider how its involvement in democratization and the
promotion of good governance in host countries can prevent the rise of anti-
refugee sentiment present in many transition states, leading to grievance-driven
insecuritv.
In the medium term, DFID's programmes should include initiatives to increase
the protection capacity of host states, enhance the rule of law in refugee
populated areas, and expand the capacity and access of national NGOs to
refugee programmes.
To this end, DFID should ensure that its representatives in host countries are
engaged in the refugee situation and aware of the potential contribution of
development initiatives in addressing security concerns.
In the long term, DFID should play a leading technical and political role in the
formulation of comprehensive solutions to protracted refugee situations by
contributing to the enhancement of the three durable solutions for refugees.
To support repatriation, DFID's activities in countries of origin should
incorporate the preconditions for successful return and reintegration of both
refugees and IDPs, including local and regional post conflict reconstruction
programmes, rehabilitation of former combatants, and income generation
programmes in support of demobihzation.
To support local integration, DFID should politically engage with host states to
consider the modalities of this solution, target development assistance to refugee
populated areas, support the rehabilitation of former refugee camps and
sefflements, and support self-sufficiency initiatives for locally integrated
refugees.
To support third-country resettlement, DFID should encourage the
consolidation and future development of the UK's fledgling refugee resettlement
programme.
More generally, DFID should contribute its unique perspective to see how these
three solutions can work in combination to form comprehensive solutions to
protracted refugee situations.
DFID, along with other stakeholders rn
address how the UN should respond to
including protracted refugee sifuations, and
assist in meeting this challenge.
the international system, needs to
the problems of state incapacity,
how to empower regional bodies to
1. BACKGROUND TO FORCED MIGRATION AND SECURITY
Forced migration has always had security implications. Intemational political concem
for refugees first emerged after World War I when mass flows from Russia and Balkan
states heightened inter-state tensions and threatened the security of European states.
These refugee crises became protracted affairs that surpassed the capacity of
humanitarian agencies and individual states to resolve them on their own. Consequently,
an international framework of institutions and agreements, a nascent international
refugee regime, was created to deal with this contentious issue. Following the end of the
Second World War, the current international refugee regime emerged in reaction to the
security threat posed to the fragile European state system by some 12 million displaced
persons. (Loescher, 2001: Chapters 2 and3)
1.1. Forced Migration and Security During the Cold War
During the Cold War, forced migration constituted one of the central concerns of US
and Western foreign policies. (Loescher and Scanlan, 1986; Zolberg et al., 1989)
Refugees were seen as part of the global struggle between East and West. Refugees
fleeing communism were portrayed as "voting with their feet". In the interest of
exploiting the ideological and public relations benefits of such movements, the West
responded through generous burden sharing and resettlement schemes. During the late
1970s and 1980s, the Indo-Chinese exodus in Southeast Asia, the flow of Afghan
refugees into Iran and Pakistan, the exodus from Central America, and the Angolan and
Mozambican refugee situations in Southem Africa and those in the Horn of Africa all
had significant security dimensions. In regions of intense superpower conflict and
competition, refugees were arrned and their military struggles were supported both
materially and ideologically. Host states did raise security concerns about refugee flows,
especially in the context of the Indo-Chinese exodus, but these concerns were addressed
comprehensively in their interest by the West.
1.2. Forced Migration and Security After the Cold War
The security implications of forced migration have gained new salience in recent years,
especially since the end of the Cold War. What resulted was a period of issue-
widening', growing out of a frustration with the narrow Cold War understanding of
security, focused on military threats external to the state. Speaking at the first summit-
level meeting at the end of the Cold War, the President of the UN Security Council
noted that "the non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian
and ecological fields have become threats to international peace and security." (UN
Security Council, 1992) Throughout the 1990s, refugee movements were central
elements of numerous IJN Security Council resolutions. (Roberts, 1998)
Following the end of the 1991 Gulf War, Iraqi suppression of widespread revolt in
northern Kurdish areas created widespread fears among the Kurds, resulting in the mass
flight of some 2 million refugees to the Turkish border and into Iran. Civil war and
famine in Somalia in 1992 displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians and caused
large-scale starvation and a breakdown of civil order. The break-up of the former
Yugoslavia in the early 1990s resulted in bitter civil wars among competing ethnic
populations and widespread ethnic cleansing and displacement. Human rights abuses
and repressive military rule drove large numbers of Haitians to flee the country by boat
throughout the 1990s, causing a serious policy problem for the United States. In most of
these and other cases, the I-IN, or regional or national forces acting with UN
authorization, directly intervened in intrastate conflicts in an attempt to tackle these
crises which led to mass displacement.
Moreover, forced displacements were also at the centre of crises in the African Great
Lakes region, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Albania, Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan. In
Kosovo, over 850,000 people were driven out of the country in 1999 in amassive and
brutal ethnic cleansing. Later in the same year in Indonesia, gangs of armed thugs, with
the active support of the military and the police, waged a campaign of terror against the
East Timorese people and against UN staff who were stationed there to monitor the
referendum that would confirm East Timor's independence.
During this period, it became clear to those engaged in the UN's peace and security
apparatus that refugee movements were not only a consequence of insecurity, but could
also be a cause of insecurity, for host states, countries of origin, for regions hosting
refugees, and even a threat to international peace and security. As such, the security
implications of refugee movements were seen as possible justification for armed
intervention under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, thus linking the political and
humanitarian anns of the United Nations.
2. THE UNHCR AND THE EMERGING SECURITY DISCOURSE
At the same time that refugees came to be viewed as possibly posing threats to
international and regional security, refugees were perceived increasingly as burdens. In
the face of growing numbers of illegal migrants and abuse of asylum systems, Western
governments became increasingly reluctant to grant asylum and enacted severe new
entry controls. The closure of borders to prevent unwanted refugee and migrant influxes
became much more widespread than it had been during the Cold War. In the West, in
place of asylum, various forms of 'temporary protection' were utilized to deal with
those fleeing war and 'ethnic cleansing'. For developing countries, the growing
numbers of displaced people entering already precarious or failing economies presented
problems that threatened domestic stability and governmental authority. Diminishing
donor govemment support for long-term refugee assistance, coupled with declining
levels of development assistance, and the imposition of structural adjustment programs
on many poorer and less stable states, reinforced and contributed to the growing
hostility towards refugees in the developing world.
In response to these global developments, most govemments not only became more
restrictionist in their refugee policies but also pushed for a comprehensive international
policy which sought to modiff the causes of refugee flows through conflict resolution,
peacemaking, and peacekeeping. These policies focused on unstable, refugee-producing
regions, to facilitate the prevention, containment of refugee flows, or their reversal
through repatriation. This was to be achieved through a series of international
humanitarian operations in the 1990s that were launched by the UN Security Council
and the UNHCR. During this period, governments felt compelled to respond to refugee
disasters, especially those covered by the media, and therefore repeatedly tasked the
UNHCR to provide emergency relief aid with a view towards alleviating, preventing, or
containing refugee crises within their own country or region of origin. For the world's
most powerful states, the provision of humanitarian assistance was financially and
politically a relatively low risk option because it satisfied the demands of the media and
public opinion for some kind of action to alleviate human suffering. But it was also used
repeatedly by governments as an excuse for refusing to take more decisive forms of
political and military intervention to deal with the underlying political causes of these
population movements.
For the UNHCR, these shifts in attitudes about intervention made it begin to perceive its
own work more in terms of contributing to regional and international peace and
security. The agency became more frequently involved in internal conflicts and in
sharing responsibility with IIN mandated military forces for assistance to displaced
people. In an effort to take advantage of the political opportunities that the post-Cold
War environment presented, the UNHCR also made a concerted effort to frame its
policies in terms of interests of the major powers in resolving conflicts and refugee
problems. It also demonstrated a greater interest in preventing refugee flows and in
finding solutions to the political problems that created mass flight. By emphasizing the
responsibilities of refugee sending states and by labelling the mass exodus of refugees
as a threat to international peace and security, UNHCR sought to legitimize its own
actions to facilitate repatriations as well as interventions by the UN and states into
regions of refugee origin to alleviate or even solve the causes of flight. The high priority
given to humanitarian operations and the increasing recognition of a link between
refugees and international security meant that UNHCR played an increasingly important
role in placing refugees on the international political agenda. (Hammerstad, 2003) From
1992 on, the High Commissioner began to report regularly to the UN Security Council
and to regional organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) on the potentially destabilizing effects of refugee and displacement
crises.
2.1. Consequences for UNHCR Activities
The emergence of a new international security environment and a more assertive UN
Security Council dramatically changed the way in which I-INHCR operated. During the
Cold War, in-country assistance and protection of internally displaced people and
victims of war were perceived to violate state sovereignty and therefore were taboo for
UN agencies. In the post-Cold War period, by contrast, the UN developed a series of
experimental measures, including a number of humanitarian interventions, for
responding to instances of forced displacement within internal conflicts. These
initiatives included the offer of temporary protection rather than full refugee status, the
establishment of safe havens, cross-border deliveries of assistance. and the use of
military resources for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. For LINHCR, the major
change in the handling of refugee issues included an increased focus on working in
countries of origin 
- 
even in countries at war 
- 
to reduce the likelihood of massive
refugee flows across borders. In addition, the UNHCR was also frequently asked to take
part in comprehensive and integrated UN peacekeeping or peacemaking operations that
involved political and military actors of the UN.
In response to these dramatic developments, the UNHCR expanded its services to a
much wider range of people who were in need of assistance. For example, 'war-affected
populations' 
- 
people who had not been uprooted but needed humanitarian assistance
and protection 
- 
comprised a substantial proportion of UNHCR's beneficiary population
during the height of the 1990's Bosnian conflict. As a result, the numbers of displaced
people and war-affected populations receiving UNHCR assistance increased
dramatically. Worldwide the number of people receiving UNHCR assistance increased
from 15 million in 1990 to a peak of 26 million in 1996. Of this total of UNHCR's
beneficiaries, refugees constituted only about 50 per cent. Consequently, UNHCR
expanded from a refugee organization into the UN's foremost humanitarian agency,
thereby gaining a higher profile in international politics and securing more generous
funding for its operations.
2.2. Disillusionment with the New Security Initiatives
By the mid-1990s, however, it became evident that these innovative methods of
assistance and protection had not been derived from any clearly defined strategy but had
been developed in an ad hoc fashion in response to immediate security crises. As
seemingly intractable conflicts continued in the Balkans, Africa and within the former
Soviet Union, it was apparent that states lacked the will to initiate effective enforcement
for maintaining peace and security, for empowering human rights mechanisms, or for
promoting sustainable development in crisis regions. The major powers had only
mlinimal interest in most countries with internal conflicts and humanitarian crises. and
international responses to refugee crises remained more often than not reactive, self-
interested, and based on ad hoc initiatives. There was no guarantee that states would
intervene in situations where it was desperately needed as in Rwanda in 1994. Bruised
by their failure to restore stability in Somalia, the world's major governments and the
UN chose to do nothing in the face of wanton mass killings in Rwanda. Similar
concems prevented Western governments from committing sufficient ground forces to
Bosnia with an enforcement mission to defend the so-called "safe areas." includins
Srebrenica.
Most alarmingly, the new ad hoc initiatives also seemed to exacerbate and prolong the
suffering in many cases of displaced people caught up in brutal conflicts. The
UNHCR's high-profile relief efforts in Northern Iraq, Bosnia and Rwanda underlined
dramatically the inadequacy of providing protection in humanitarian relief programs in
the midst of on-going civil conflicts and regional security crises. In particular, the
failure to halt the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the failure to halt the militarization of
refugee camps in Zaire in 1994-6, the failure to prevent the forced repatriation of
Rwandan refugees in 1996, and the failure to protect and assist the Rwandan refugees
driven into eastern Zaire fromlate 1996 onward vividly demonstrated for UNHCR the
lack of commitment on the part of states to address the underlying causes of security
crises and conflicts in order to find solutions to refugee problems. The international
community was all too often content to encourage UNHCR and other humanitarian
organizations to deal with the humanitarian consequences of conflicts rather than to
actively engage in seeking political and security solutions in intrastate wars. It became
clear to UNHCR that if refugee problems were to be resolved then the international
community would have to become active well beyond the mandate of UNHCR.
By the mid-1990s, the major powers, particularly the United States, perceived that the
interventions of the early 1990s had overextended the UN and that in the future
interventions should be much more limited and essentially restricted to the most
strategically important areas of the world. As Kofi Annan acknowledged in his annual
report to the UN General Assembly in 1999: "the failure to intervene was driven more
by the reluctance of Member States to pay the human and other costs of intervention,
and by doubts that the use of force would be successful, than by concerns about
sovereignty." (Annan, 1999: 2I) The use of armed force to stem refugee movements
remains highly controversial within the international community. (Wheeler, 1999) The
NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and the bitter debates over Iraq in 2003
demonstrate that there exist significant objections, particularly among the developing
states, to the right to intervene concept and to the use offorce to resolve security threats,
much less refugee crises.
2.3. "Human Security" and UNHCR
Disillusionment with its own shortcomings and with the failure of states to take action
in the Great Lakes and other refugee-prone regions gave rise to efforts on the part of
UNHCR to tone down the political elements of its security discourse, to redefine
security by giving it a more humanitarian emphasis, and to develop the concept as an
operational tool for policy formulation and implementation. (Hammerstad, 2003)
Building on the notion of "human security" first introduced in the UNDP's 1994 Human
Development Report (UNDP, 1994) and later adopted into their foreign policy agendas
by states such as Canada, Sweden and Norway, UNHCR began to use the concept from
the mid 1990s on as a means to establish harmony between the security concerns of
states and the protection needs of forcibly displaced persons and the security needs of
the staff of international humanitarian agencies.
Throughout her term as High Commissioner, Sadako Ogata stressed that her most
important challenge was how to strike a balance between the principles of refugee
protection and the legitimate concerns of states. (Ogata, 1997a) However, the disastrous
protection crises of the Great Lakes and other operations demonstrated for UNHCR that
this balance could not be achieved solely through appealing to the security interests of
states. UNHCR had overestimated the extent to which the international community was
willing and able to intervene in sovereign states to aid refugees and displaced people. It
also became clear that the security interests of states were naffower and more self-
interested than UNHCR anticipated and were not always compatible with the protection
needs of refugees. Consequently, UNHCR endeavoured through advocating "human
security" to show how the real security of states and the international community could
only be achieved by providing security for "people". (UNHCR, 1997' Ogata, I997b;
Ogata, 1999) In other words, UNHCR's use of human security was part of the agency's
attempt to shape the interests of states in directions more conducive to refugee
protection and assistance, as well as to mitigate the political and financial constraints
imposed upon it by its environment.
However, the concept of "human security" had its own limitations. While human
security emphasized the links between human rights, physical security of individuals
and the security of states, it was so all-encompassing a concept that it did not provide
UNHCR with a very useful tool with which to understand and explain the nature of
refugee problems. (Hammerstad,2003) The concept also did not adequately address the
disjuncture between UNHCR's emphasis on human rights and the security concerns of
states affected by disruptive refugee movements. In particular, human security
underplayed or ignored the security concerns of states, especially the long-term
consequences of hosting large numbers of refugees. It also focused on forced migration
as a consequence of conflict, but ignored the fact that refugees can frequently be the
cause of conflict. Consequently, human security as defined by UNHCR had a
questionable utility as a framework for understanding the relationship between state
security concerns and refugee protection.
2.4.The "Ladder of Options" and Demilitarizing Refugee Camps
After the Great Lakes disaster, the international community began to debate a more
structured response to address the security threats of hosting refugees, particularly the
threat posed by the movement of large numbers of refugees co-mingled with combatants
in refugee camps. (Jacobsen and Crisp, 2000) In April 2000, the UN Security Council
(Security Council resolution 1296) requested the Secretary-General to bring to its
attention incidents involving the militarization of refugee camps and to consider taking
"appropriate steps to create a secure environment for civilians endangered by conflicts".
A year later, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan recognized the need for a military
force to keep armed combatants out of refugee settlements and recommended that the
Security Council deploy "international military observers to monitor the situation in
camps for internally displaced persons and refugees when the presence of afins,
combatants and armed elements is suspected...(and) consider the range of options ...
(including) compelling disarmament of the combatants or armed elements." (UN
Security Council, 200 1)
The UNHCR had been particularly shocked by the lack of international assistance it
received in Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania to separate out the
interhamwe and other genocidaires from the civilian refugee communities. In the Great
Lakes, UNHCR protection officers were totally ineffective in preventing the
mllitat'rzation of the Rwandan refugee camps. They had neither the mandate nor the
training and resources to carry out demilitarization and their calls for international
assistance went unheeded.
To deal with such situations in the future, the UNHCR proposed a "ladder of options",
ranging from contingency planning and preventive measures through monitoring and
policing to forceful intervention under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as the foundation
for a new UN policy response to the problems of insecurity in refugee camps. (UNHCR
ExCom, 1999; UNHCR ExCom 2000) Subsequently, the UNHCR established stand-by
arrangements with a limited number of governments for the provision of police and
public security experts who were designated as Humanitaian Security Officers (HSO)
to be deployed as part of UNHCR's Emergency Response teams at the beginning of
refugee crises and would work with public security institutions of receiving countries.
I-INHCR also enhanced its own emergency response mechanism by participating in
numerous civil-military conferences, designing training programs for HSOs, and
establishing a focal point with the UN Security forces (UNSECORD). Finally, UNHCR
entered into discussions with the UN Department of Peacekeeping (DPKO) regarding
the possible deployment of missions to situations in which refugee-populated areas have
become militarized or where they run the risk of falling under the control of groups
suspected of genocide or crimes against humanity.
3. THE LITERATURE ON FORCED MIGRATION AND STATE SECURITY
During the 1990s, not only did policy makers broaden the international security agenda,
but a period of issue-widening' was also seen in the intemational relations literature.
(Ulman, 1983; Matthews, 1989; Homer-Dixon, 1991) This process was partly motivated
by a recognition that 'security' is an 'essentially contested concept' and therefore
inherently difficult to define. (Buzan, 1991) As outlined in Hammerstad's paper, the
link between conflict and development rose in prominence during this period. Research
began to highlight how factors as diverse as environmental degradation, economic
interdependence, transnational crime and migration and refugee movements had the
potential to influence state and regional security agendas. Consequently, a distinct
literature on refugee movements and international security emerged.
In the early 1990s, researchers and scholars began to.take cognizance of the rising
importance of security in migration and refugee studies.' Early works aimed to provide
a basic typology of migration flows and their related security concerns, particularly for
sending and receiving states. Examining the question in a broad, cross-regional and
comparative perspective, these studies sought to clari$ the possible security
implications of refugee movements and the potential concerns of host states. Particular
reference was also made to the numerous cases of "refugee waffiors" (Zolbery et al.,
1989) and the negative impact of these forces on regional and international security.
3.1. Limitations of the Literature on Forced Migration and Security
These early works, however, had certain limitations. First, the works fail to incorporate
a comprehensive conceptualization of 'security' appropriate to the study of forced
migration. Second, while attempting to bring the migration question into the mainstream
of security studies, the nature of the security implications of migration portrayed focus
disproportionately on the 'high politics' dimension of the security concerns of host-
states, focusing on external security threats of a military nature, at the necessary
expense of the 'low politics' concerns, relating to domestic stability. Both works make
reference to concerns surrounding host community receptivity and questions of ethnic
affinity, but, as recent cases illustrate, the domestic, 'low politics', or indirect security
concerns, have proven to be far more pervasive and preoccupying for host-states than
previously thought, especially in Africa, and in light of the failures of international
solidarity and burden sharing.
Following these earlier works, from the mid-1990s on, the literature on migration and
security focused more on the securitization of asylum in the European context and on
1 Two of the earliest works were Myron Weiner's edited volum e International Migration and Securily
and Gil Loescher's IISS Adephi Paper Refugee Movements and International Security. Both works
attempted to raise the issue of forced migration as both a potential cause and consequence of insecurity,
by emphasising the 'high politics' dimensions of the issue and by charting a cross-regional framework for
future research in the area. Both studies had as a primary objective the raising of the profile of
international migration in the eyes of national security and foreign policy planners and defining the issue
for further research. Both researchers argued that it was essential to recognize that refugee problems are
in fact intensely political. Mass migrations create domestic insiability, generate interstate tension and
threaten regional and sometimes international security. These authors argued that solutions to refugee
problems necessitated not only humanitarian but also political solutions.
notions of societal motivations for casting migration in terms of security concerns.
(Huysmans, 1995; Waever et al., 1993; Waever, 1995; Buzan et al., 1998; Bigo, 1996;
Bigo, 1998) The focus of the debate has been on the way that societal identity and
societal concerns about migration and immigration translate into state action against
migrants. The focus is predominantly on the use of security in public discourse, and
who has the authority to turn migration into a security issue.
While this literature lays an important foundation to understand the process by which
the language of security may be applied to cases of migration by various actors within
society for differing reasons and with various degrees of success, it is not directly
applicable to the question of host-state security in developing countries. The arguments
contained within the more recent literature are heavily based on the European context,
especially the European state and European state-society relations. In fact, the nature of
the European state is very different from the nature of the state in much of the
developing world. (Clapham, 1996; Jackson, 1990; Herbst, 2000) The realities of the
refugee issue in the developing world, especially Africa, are quantitatively and
qualitatively so different that there is a clear need for a different approach for
understanding the security concerns of host-states in the Third World. (Loescher, 1992;
Chimni, 1998) As Jeff Crisp has noted, the list of concerns of developing countries
differs considerably from the concerns ofEuropean states, and includes: the causes and
nature of the displacement, the mixed character of refugee camp populations, the
political and military abuse of camps, the location of refugee camps in border areas, the
weak rule of law in refugee camps, and the impact of these camps on the local
communities 
- 
all issues of concern to DFID. (Crisp, 2000c)
3.2. Recent Research Priorities
International relations researchers currently address the security implications of forced
migration in two ways. First, and especially since September 11,2001, there has been
an emphasis on the potential links between migration and asylum in the West and
transnational crime, terrorism and the identity of European political communities. (Van
Selm, 2003; Gibney, 2002; Zolberg,2002) As a result of these concerns, many Western
resettlement countries and traditional asylum countries, have reconsidered their
admissions levels and procedures. Increased security screening has resulted in long
delays in resettlement processing, while security-motivated legislation has led to
increased barriers to entry in Western asylum countries. There is a rising opinion on the
part of many Western policy makers that the potential security implications of refugee
movements can be contained in regions of refugee origin, and this approach has
partially contributed to an increased consideration of regional processing and 'zones of
protection' by Western policy makers, notably the United Kingdom. Of the many
concerns with this new approach (Loescher and Milner, 2003), paramount to agencies
like DFID should be that 'regionalization' increases the burdens borne by host states in
regions of refugee origin, compounds their security concems, and leads to increased
reluctance to host refugees.
Second, as outlined above, through multilateral discussions and negotiations, there has
been a focus on the security implications of large-scale and sudden refugee movements
in developing countries, and the particular problem of armed groups within some
refugee communities.
Both of these approaches are useful, and address current policy concerns of
governments, but there is a third, and more pressing, situation in which forced migration
may cause security concerns on the part of host states, especially in the developing
world. This third situation is the case of protracted refugee situations.
4. PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATIONS AND SECURITY
Since the early 1990s, the international community has focused on refugee emergencies,
delivering humanitarian assistance to refugees and war-affected populations, and
encouraging large-scale repatriation programs in high profile regions such as the
Balkans, the Great Lakes or recently Afghanistan and Iraq. (Loescher, 2001; UNHCR,
2000) The majority of today's almost l0 million refugees, however, are trapped in
protracted refugee situations, unable to return home and without the prospect either of a
solution in the country where they have sought asylum or of resettlement abroad. Such
situations are often characterized by long periods of exile (stretching to decades for
some groups) and can occur on most continents in a range of environments including
camps, rural settlements and urban centres.
A serious consequence of protracted refugee situations is that they can foster instability,
insecurity and conflict and can even be prime targets for recruitment into armed units
and terrorism. Such refugee situations may not only cause such direct security concerns
but also have indirect security implications, through the exacerbation of pre-existing
social and economic tensions among local populations. Thus, protracted refugee
situations are no less dangerous sources of instability than other more conventional
security threats and there are reasons of state and security for the international
community to focus its attention on protracted refugee situations. As such, these refugee
situations should be of particular concern to DFID.
The longterrn presence of Burundian refugees in Tanzania, Sudanese and Somali
refugees in Kenya, Liberian refugees in West Africa, Afghans remaining in Pakistan,
Burmese in Thailand 
- 
all in regions where DFID is currently active 
- 
and other chronic
refugee populations, have come to be seen by many host states as a source of insecurity.
In response, they have enacted policies of containing refugees in isolated and insecure
camps, have prevented the arrival of additional refugees, and have, in extreme cases,
engaged in forcible repatriation. (Amnesty International,I99T; Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights, 1995; Human Rights Watch, 1999; Crisp, 2000b; Rutinwa, 1999) Not
surprisingly, these populations are also increasingly a source of insecurity for Western
states. Refugee camps are sometimes breeding grounds international terrorism (Harman,
2002) and armed groups in these camps engage in activities that destabilize not only
host states but also entire regions. (Kamara, 2001) Given the transnational importance
and significance of protracted refugee situations in today's security environment, much
greater attention needs to be given by DFID and other intemational agencies to
understanding this pressing problem and developing appropriate policy responses.
Unfortunately, until very recently, the problem of protracted refugee situations has
largely been ignored by scholars and practitioners. A few key studies addressed this
issue in the 1970s and 1980s.'More recently, a series of studies were undertaken by the
Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit at UNHCR.'While these studies provide important
new insights into protracted refugee situations in Africa and elsewhere, the primary
focus has been on addressing the daily security concerns of refugees and not on the
links between local and regional security and protracted refugee situations. This work
also largely focuses on refugees in camps and not on urban refugees or self-settled
refugees, partly because these groups are of less direct concern to UNHCR.
The rising significance of protracted refugee situations has recently been given a higher
profile within intergovernmental seffings. In December 2001, there was an African
Ministerial Meeting on protracted refugee situations (UNHCR Africa Bureau, 200Ia;
UNHCR, Africa Bureau, 200lb; UNHCR, 2001a) and the issue has been considered at
recent UNHCR Executive Committee sessions (Lubbers, 2002) as well as within the
framework of the UNHCR Global Consultations on Refugee Protection. (UNHCR
ExCom, 2002a) Following preliminary discussion on comprehensive solutions for the
most prominent protracted refugee situations, (UNHCR 2003a; UNHCR, 2003b)
UNHCR hosted a series of meetings in early March 2004 to generate international
support for the future repatriation of a number of refugee populations in Africa.
UNHCR argued that conditions in countries like Sudan, Somalia, Liberia, Burundi,
Sierra Leone and Angola were suitable for the preparation of large-scale returns in the
coming years, pending positive developments in the relevant peace processes and in the
ability of UNHCR and partner agencies to build the necessary capacity in the host
countries to effectively receive and reintegrate the returning populations. UNHCR
subsequently appealed for $8.8 million for preparatory activities in Sudan, but it has so
far received $3 million. Likewise, it has appealed for 839.2 million to support
operations in Liberia for the return and reintegration of both refugees and internally
displaced persons, but it has received only $3 million. While repatriation is not
immediately possible to these countries, investment is essential in the coming months to
ensure that the infrastructure is in place to support repatriation in the coming years.
These examples underscore the highly selective nature of most donor funding for
refugee situations. A recent study on donor behaviour (Smillie and Minear, 2003)
argues that funding for humanitarian programmes largely reflects the foreign and
domestic policies of donor governments. Such behaviour does not provide a coherent or
effective system for financing intemational humanitarian activities. Donor governments
give vastly disproportionate amounts of aid to a few well-known cases and far lesser aid
to dozens of other less well-publicized refugee caseloads. The absence of an
autonomous and government-assessed resource base for UNHCR, for example, continue
to limit the response to present and future refugee crises just as they have done for the
past 50 years. While the TINHCR has recently tried to overcome these financial
constraints by trying to access development funds to finance unmet needs, it is not yet
" The Refugee Policy Group in Washington, D.C. produced reports on protracted refugee settlements in
Africa outlining many of the problems confronting long-staying refugees at that time. T. Betts, Robert
Chambers and Art Hansen, among others, conducted research on some of these groups in Africa and
assessed the international community's policy responses, particularly progralnmes aimed to promote local
integration.
3 Individual studies conducted for the research are posted on the web-page of UNHCR's Evaluation and
Policy Analysis Unit: http://www.unhcr.ch/epau For a summary of the research findings, see: Crisp 2002.
evident that this will prove to be a successful strategy. In light of this situation, donor
governments and agencies like DFID need to work towards a strengthened multilateral
regime which has the mandate, capacity and resources to meet current unmet refugee
needs in a more impartial and effective manner.
4.1. The Nature of Security Concerns: Direct Threats
In addition to the lack of donor support for these preparations, it is also of concern that
these discussions have not been accompanied by a sufficient understanding of the
security impact of long-staying refugee populations. Protracted refugee situations result
in a wide range of direct and indirect security concerns for host states and states in the
region. The direct threats faced by the host-state, posed by the spill-over of conflict
and the presence of 'refugee warriors', are by far the strongest link between refugees
and conflict. Here, there are no intervening variables between forced migration and
violence as the migrants themselves are actively engaged in armed campaigns typically,
but not exclusively, against the country of origin. Such campaigns have the potential of
regionalizing the conflict and dragging the host-state into what was previously an intra-
state conflict.
It is important to note that there was a time when states were willing to host refugee
warrior communities, notwithstanding the threat they posed. In the context of the Cold
War and the ideological struggle between East and West, the spill-over of violence
assumed a very different meaning than it does today. At the time, "the emergence of
armed groups of exiles, the so-called 'refugee warriors', symbolised for the West the
popular rejection of communist governments and served to legitimize the resistance
movements." (Loescher, 1992: 11) Examples of such resistance and support are to be
found in the anti-Soviet Mujahideen based in Pakistan, the Khmers Rouge in Thailand
and the Nicaraguan Contras. (Loescher 2001: 201 
- 
246) As part of the Cold War logic
of international security, all these groups received US and Western support, both
military and political. (Loescher,1992: 12)
With the end of the Cold War, the logic has changed, but the relevance of refugee
warriors remains. This relevance is especially true in Africa, as brought home with
particular force in the maelstrom of violence that gripped the Great Lakes region of
Central Africa between 1994 and 1996. It was this particular case that initiated
discussions between UNHCR, regional states and the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations, resulting in the formulation of the ladder of options policy.
The direct causes of insecurity to both host states and regional and extra-regional actors
stemming from chronic refugee populations are best understood within the context of
so-called failed states, as in Somalia, and, the rise of warlordism, as in the case of
Liberia. In such situations, refugee camps are used as a base for guerrilla, insurgent or
terrorist activities. Armed groups hide behind the humanitarian character of refugee
camps and settlements, and use these camps as an opportunity to recruit among the
disaffected displaced populations. In such situations, there is the risk that humanitarian
aid, including food, medical assistance and other support mechanisms, might be
expropriated to support armed elements. Similar security concerns may arise within
urban refugee populations where gangs and criminal networks can emerge within
displaced and disenfranchised populations. These groups take advantage of the
transnational nature of refugee populations, of remittances from abroad and the
marginal existence of urban refugees to further their goals. In both the urban and camp
context, refugee movements have proven to provide a cover for the illicit activities,
ranging from prostitution and people smuggling to the trade in small arms, narcotics and
diamonds.
The security consequences ofsuch activities for host states and regional actors are real.
They include cross-border attacks on both host states and countries of origin, attacks on
humanitarian personnel, refugees and civilian populations. Direct security concerns can
also lead to serious bilateral and regional political and diplomatic tensions. Cross border
flows are perceived by host states to impede on their national sovereignty, especially
given the tenuous control that many central governments in the developing world have
over their border regions. Finally, the activities of armed elements among refugee
populations not only violate refugee protection and human rights principles, but can
constitute threats to international peace and security. (Dowty and Loescher,1996)
4.2.The Nature of Security Concerns: Indirect Threats
More difficult to identiff, but just as potentially destabilising as direct threats, refugee
movements may pose indirect threats to the host state. Indirect threats may arise when
the presence of refugees exacerbates previously existing inter-communal tensions in the
host country, shifts the balance of power between communities, or causes grievances
among local populations. At the root of such security concerns is the failure of
international solidarity and burden sharing with host countries. Local and national
grievances are particularly heightened when refugees compete with local populations
for resources, jobs and social services, including health care, education and housing.
Refugees are also frequently scapegoats for breakdowns in law and order in refugee
populated areas, both rural and urban.
The indirect threat to security that long-staying refugees can pose to host states is a key
concept that has been lacking in both the research and policy consideration of refugee
movements. In these cases, refugees alone are a necessary but not a sufficient cause of
host state insecurity. It is not the refugee that is a threat to the host state, but the context
within which the refugees exist that results in the securitization of the asylum question
for many states.
Lacking policy alternatives, many host governments now present refugee populations as
security threats to justiff actions that would not otherwise be permissible, especially
when the state is confronted with the pressures of externally-imposed democratization
and economic liberalization. More generally, the presence of refugees can exacerbate
previously existing tensions (as also noted in Hammerstad's paper) and can change the
balance of power between groups in the country of asylum. For this reason refugees
play a significant but indirect role in the causes of insecurity and violence, but with
consequences potentially of the same scale as the direct threats. Given DFID's
involvement in democratization and good governance programmes, it should be
especially aware of these types of concerns.
This dynamic has been emphasised in recent research examining the dramatic
restrictions on asylum that have been imposed by host states in Africa since the mid-
1990s (as outlined in Kamanga's paper). Several researchers have pointed to the
significance of the absence of meaningful burden sharing and the growing xenophobia
in many African countries as the key factors motivating restrictive asylum policies.
(Crisp, 2000; Rutinwa, 1999) It has also been argued that these xenophobic sentiments
"have emerged at a time when most of Africa is democratizing and governments are
compelled to take into account public opinion in formulating various policies. The result
has been the adoption of anti-refugee platforms by political parties which result in anti-
refugee policies and actions by governments." (Rutinwa, 1999: 2) Just as "government
leaders found themselves facing more and more pressures to restrict entq/" as "asylum
became part of the cut and thrust of domestic politics" in Western Europe in recent
years, Gibney emphasises that "the rise of multiparty democracy in Africa ... has
arguably diminished the autonomy of state elites in determining the security agenda."
(Gibney, 2002:7)
It has been argued that the Tanzanian govemment's decision to close its border with
Burundi was closely linked to the lead-up to the 1995 parliamentary and presidential
elections. Opposition parties exploited local dissatisfaction with the government's
handling of the asylum question in the region, and thereby tried to create political
opportunity by demonstrating that they had the power to restore order and stability to
border regions by expelling unpopular refugee populations. (Runtinwa,1996:299)
This example serves to highlight the dynamics of internal competition between the core
and periphery of a state, and how the presence of refugee camps typically in the
"hinterland" (Herbst, 2000: 3) of a state influences this dynamic. The presence of large
numbers of refugees in the periphery of a state may give that region significance that it
did not previously have. This is particularly true when the political geography of the
African state is considered.
Herbst argues that "states are only viable if they are able to control the territory defined
by their borders" and that such control is "assured by developing an infrastructure to
broadcast power and by gaining the loyalty of citizens." (Herbst, 2002: 3) Unlike
European states, which have managed to broadcast this power to all sectors of the state,
Herbst argues that African states have concentrated power in economic centres and have
very limited control over the periphery of the state. The presence of large refugee
populations in these 'hinterlands', where the regime typically does not exercise effective
control, is a serious concern for the state. This fact, combined with an understanding
that "rule by the centre" in many African states is so weak and that there is "space for
challengers to form large and sophisticated rebel armies" (Herbst, 2000: 255) in the
periphery of the state, clearly adds to an understanding of why African states are
increasingly concerned about the security implications of large, insecure refugee camps
and settlements in their hinterland.
Furthermore, it has been argued that "in countries which are divided into antagonistic
racial, ethnic, religious or other groupings, a major influx can place precariously
balanced multi-ethnic societies under great strain and may even threaten the political
balance of power." (Loescher, 1,992: 42) In this way, the presence of refugees has been
demonstrated to accelerate "existing internal conflicts in the host country." (Weiner,
1993: 16) For example, this concern was made most explicitly clear in Macedonia's
reluctance to accept Kosovar Albanian refugees in March 1999, citing the concern that
the mass of Kosovar Albanian refusees threatened to destabilise Macedonia's ethnic
balance.
But, not all refugees are seen as threats. The question of which refugees are seen as
threats, and why, may be partially explained by understanding the perception of
refugees as members of the local political community or as outsiders. As Loescher
argues, "in the Third World, the remarkable receptivity provided to millions of Afghans
in Pakistan and Iran, to ethnic kin from Bulgaria in Turkey, to Ethiopians in the Sudan,
to Ogadeni Ethiopians in Somalia, to southern Sudanese in Uganda, to Issaq Somali in
Djibouti and to Mozambicans in Malawi has been facilitated by the ethnic and linguistic
characteristics they share with their hosts." (Loescher, 1992 42) In this sense, the
importance of affinity and shared group identity cannot be overstated. If a host
community perceives the incoming refugee as 'one of us', then positive and generous
conceptions of distributive justice will apply. The empirical evidence is overwhelming.
Conversely, if the refugees are seen as members of an 'out-group', they are likely to
receive a hostile reception. In cases where there is a division along ethnic, linguistic or
religious lines, "a major population influx can place precariously balanced multi-ethnic
societies under great strain and may even threaten the political balance of power."
(Loescher, 1992:42)
Indeed, refugees "as an out-group, can be blamed for all untoward activities." (Maluwa,
1995: 657) While levels of crime may rise by no more than expected with a comparable
rise in population, refugees increasingly are seen as the cause. Maluwa also argues that
the "presence of massive numbers of refugees" can "create feelings of resentment and
suspicion, as the refugee population increasingly, and often wrongly, gets blamed for the
economic conditions that may arise within the domestic population." (Maluwa, 1995:
657) This can lead to a point where "poverty, unemployment, scarcity of resources, and
even crime and disease, are suddenly attributed to the presence of these refugees and
other foreigners." (Maluwa, 1995: 657)
5. POLICY R-ECOMMENDATIONS: ELEMENTS OF A NECESSARY
RESPONSE TO SECURITY CONCERNS
As this paper has argued, refugee movements can result in a range of security concerns
for host states and states in the region. As the causes and consequences of these
concerns are diverse, it is not possible to formulate a single policy response to all
migration-related security concerns. In fact, the elements of a necessary response are
diverse.
5.1. Responding to Direct Security Concerns
In the short term, direct security concerns must be addressed through supporting the
separation and exclusion of armed elements within the refugee population,
notwithstanding the highly complex nature of this undertaking. (O'Neill, 2000;
Rutinwa,2002)
One of UNHCR's first efforts to operationalise its new policy response to armed
elements, 'the ladder of options', was its attempt to implement a "security package" in
westem Tanzania and to move Sierra Leonean refugee camps further from the border in
Guinea to protect refugees from attacks by armed elements. While these actions helped
create greater security for some of the refugee communities in Tanzania and Guinea,
they did not succeed in separating armed elements and other exiles from the civilian
refugee populations in these countries. (Crisp, 2001) A similar effort by UNHCR and
DPKO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in mid-2001 to separate armed
refugees from their civilian counterparts met with greater success. (Yu,2002)
From these experiences, it is evident that the future success of the ladder of options
depends on the practical partnerships and 'security packages' that UNHCR is able to
form with the DPKO and governments. While discussions between DPKO and UNHCR
have set the groundwork for future cooperation between the two offices, serious
differences of approach and political and resource constrains remain. On the one hand,
UNHCR and other humanitarian aid organizations fear that too close an association with
the military compromises their impartiality and neutrality, and on the other,
governments are reluctant to authorize military forces for such functions. Protection for
refugees inmllitat'.zed situations also depends critically on the willingness and ability of
host states and countries of refugee origin to observe international humanitarian norms
regarding the treatment of refugees and non-combatants. Such issues received
significant attention during the recent UNHCR-sponsored Global Consultations on
International Protection, and were highlighted for particular action in the ensuing
Agenda for Protection. (UNHCR, 2001b; UNHCR, 2001c; UNHCR ExCom, 2002a;
UNHCR ExCom, 2002b; Lawyers Commiffee for Human Rights, 2002)
There is considerable evidence to suggest that refugee participation in armed conflict
can and has led to the diffusion of small arms in host states (Small Arms Survey, 2004),
to the forced recruitment of refugees into armed bands, the expropriation of
humanitarian aid to support armed elements, and the rise of criminal activity in camps
and urban seffings. The development of more effective security packages can assist
UNHCR, DPKO, regional peacekeeping units and host states to deal with the broad
array of direct security concerns present in many regions of refugee origin.
As DFID develops its policy towards refugees and forced migration, it should give
careful consideration to the ways in which it can lend support to the development of
more effective security packages. Focusing on the role of arms in refugee camps is an
important first step in proposing anns control measures and other demilitarizing regimes
aimed at reducing violence emanating from and within refugee communities. In
particular, DFID should consider how its experience in demobilization and disarmament
can contribute to better programmes in a refugee context. At the same time, DFID
should encourage TINHCR and DPKO to expand its understanding of security packages
to include support to the process of return and reintegration. Finally, DFID involvement
in security sector reform should include training and capacity building for national
security services to implement host-state obligations as articulated by UN Security
Council resolution 1208 (1998) and ExCom Conclusion 94.
5.2. Responding to Indirect Security Concerns
As with responding to the direct security concerns, responding to indirect threats
requires the engagement of a range of actors and agencies, not only UNHCR.
Development agencies, such as DFID, have a vital partnership role to play, working
closely with UNHCR to devise and implement appropriate programmes. UNHCR
cannot and should not be expected to address these concerns on its own.
Indirect threats are best addressed in the short to medium term through development
initiatives and targeted assistance designed to address the burdens on local communities
related to the hosting of refugees and to ease tensions between refugees and the local
community. In the long term, the security implications of protracted refugee situations
are best addressed through comprehensive solutions, involving a broad range of policy
interventions.
The remainder of this paper considers how development initiatives can play a role in
addressing the security implications of refugee movements. It draws on recent field
research in Kenya and Tanzania to outline how targeted intervention can make a
significant contribution to the security of not only refugee populated areas, but also to
the security of the host state. In the long term, however, it will be argued that such
interventions are only coping mechanisms, pending the formulation and implementation
of comprehensive solutions to resolve protracted refugee situations.
5.3. Lessons Learned: The Firewood Project in Kenya
Kenya and Tanzania host two of the most challenging protracted refugee situations in
Africa." Kenya has hosted over 135,000 Somali refugees since 1992. The overwhelming
majority of these refugees live in three camps near the town of Dadaab, in the Northeast
Province of Kenya, approximately 80kms from the border with Somalia. During the
1990s, these camps were renowned as the most violent refugee camps in the world,
where rape, murder and armed robbery were almost daily occuffences. (Crisp, 2000a)
Violence was endemic not only in the camps but also in the areas sulrounding the
camps, as bands of shiftas, or bandits, attacked convoys of humanitarian relief, aid
workers, and refugees collecting firewood outside the camps.
A series of interventions were introduced by the UNHCR, with the support of the donor
community, in the late 1990s, including a mobile court system to try those suspected of
criminal offences, additional support to the Kenyan police to substantially increase their
presence in and around the camps, and the firewood project. The firewood project was
designed to provide refugees with 30oh of their firewood needs, with the objective of
reducing the exposure of refugee women to sexual violence by reducing the amount of
time they would be required to spend in the insecure areas around the camps.
The six years following the introduction of the firewood project in 1998 witnessed a
dramatic decline not only in the number of reported cases of rapes in the three Dadaab
camps, but also in murder and armed robbery. In 1998, there were over 300 reported
cases of violent crime in the Dadaab camps? of which 104 were cases of rape. By 2003,
that number had fallen dramatically: to 36 reported cases of violent crime, of which 15
were cases of rape.
UN and NGO partners working in Dadaab universally believe that this improvement in
refugee security and the dramatic decline in violent crime has been overwhelmingly the
result of the firewood project and its positive secondary benefits, namely that it has
created jobs for the local population and has encouraged young men who would
* Details of the policy responses in Kenya andTanzania were collected during field visits to Nairobi and
Dadaab (2001 and 2004) andDar es Salaam (1999 and 2004) andKibondo (2004). Internal reports and
statistics on these programmes are held on file with the authors.
otherwise pursue banditry as a means of livelihood to participate in the more lucrative
trade in firewood. Under the programme, villages in a 50 - 100km radius from the
camps are contracted by the GTZ, UNHCR's environment programme implementing
partner, to collect deadwood. Since 1998, the project has supplied between 8 
- 
10,000
metric tones of firewood a year for the refugees, and has contributed an average of 48
million Kenyan shillings (approximately f,330,000 at the current exchange rate) to the
local economy. It is estimated that roughly half of this amount is returned to the
refugees as, in many cases, they are sub-contracted by the local population.
The firewood project thereby mitigates the indirect security burden in Kenya in a
number of ways. First, it reduces the strain on the scarce environmental resource of
firewood in and around Dadaab by ensuring that the firewood is collected in a managed
way across a wider area. Second, it ensures an income to the local population, thereby
reducing grievances that may arise between refugees and Kenya, notwithstanding the
ethnic similarity between the populations. Third, by providing a context within which
the refugees and the local population can cooperate in a large scale, mutually beneficial
project, better understanding is developed between the two groups, which serves as an
important basis for future conflict resolution at a local level. Although a costly
programme, the firewood project is one example of a development-related project that
has played a significant role in addressing the security implications of the protracted
presence of Somali refugees in northern Kenya. DFID may consider how such a
programme may be replicated in other contexts.
5.4. Lessons Learned: SPRAAs in Tanzania
Special Programmes for Refugee Affected Areas (SPRAAs) is a second example of
possible development-related interventions. In both Kenya andTanzania, SPRAAs have
been implemented in recent years to directly address the grievances of the local
population by providing services and benefits to the local population that resides near
refugee camps.
The positive effects of SPRAAs have been most striking in Kibondo, a district in
Western Tanzania that has hosted over 100,000 mostly Burundian refugees since 1993.
A number of direct and indirect security concerns have been expressed by local and
national authorities in relation to the presence of Burundian refugees in Kibondo. Most
pressing has been the allegations that armed elements from a number of Burundian rebel
groups are based in the camps and carry-out fundraising and recruitment activities
within the camps. These allegations have been thoroughly denied by the Tanzanian
government, and steps have been taken, along with UNHCR, to increase the security
presence in the camps and the ability of the local security forces to screen for armed
elements among the refugees, as outlined above.
But the protracted presence of the refugee population in Western Tanzania has also
resulted in the rise in significant grievances against the refugees and a common belief
that their presence has resulted in a rise in banditry, crime, disease and environmental
degradation, in addition to placing a significant strain on the local infrastructure and
public services. As a result, relations between refugees and local authorities have
deteriorated, and a sense of insecurity now prevails.
In an attempt to reverse this trend, I-INHCR and its implementing partners have
undertaken a wide range of programmes to directly benefit the local population and
counter the negative affects of the presence of such a large refugee population. Over
US$ 1.25 million has been spent in recent years in a range of programmes, including the
rehabilitation of roads used by aid convoys, the improvement of water supply to local
communities, development of local communication infrastructure, the building of local
schools and health centres and the planting of trees. In 2003 alone, over 1.65 million
tree seedlings were planted in the areas surrounding refugee camps in Western
Tanzania.
A recent report by the Centre for the Study of Forced Migration at the University of Dar
es Salaam (2003) comprehensively reviewed the allegations made by Tanzanian
officials, both locally and nationally, that the presence of refugees in districts like
Kibondo are a burden to the host state, and constitute a threat to Tanzatian security. In
assessing the cost of hosting refugees against the benefits that have accrued to the local
population, both directly through the SPRAAs and indirectly through the creation of
employment and larger markets, the report concludes that the hosting of refugees has
been a benefit to Tanzania. Indeed, local community and business leaders at the local
level recognize the efforts that have been made to ensure that the presence of refugees
benefits local development, and have worked closely with UNHCR in the formulation
of SPRAAs.
Activities such as SPRAAs and the firewood project contribute to an improved security
and protection environment by reducing competition between refugees and the local
population over scarce resources and by reducing local grievances towards refugees. At
the same time, however, it has been argued that such programmes, and more generally
the presence of refugees and refugee programmes, could, if effectively managed,
significantly contribute to longer-term local and national development. (Jacobsen,2002)
There is, therefore, a double benefit in the short to medium term: development-related
projects targeting refugee populated areas can foster an environment of greater security
and protection for refugees and the local population, while also contributing to broader
national development objectives. DFID has a vital role to play in understanding the
successes of past programmes and identiffing new areas where similar approaches can
be applied.
The implications of SPRAAs for DFID's poverty reduction policies are obvious.
Protracted refugee situations, such as Burundians in Tanzania, not only pose indirect
security burdens for host countries but also perpetuate poverty and social and political
deprivation. As observed in the UNHCR June 2004 Standing Committee paper on
protracted refugee situations (UNHCR, 2004): "The World Bank notes three dimensions
of poverty: lack of income and assets; voicelessness and powerlessness in the
institutions of state and society; and vulnerability to adverse shocks, linked to an
inability to cope with them." UNHCR notes that refugees suffer from all three
conditions and not only lack national protection, but are also desperately poor. We have
argued above that poverty can also lead refugees to a range of negative survival tactics,
many of which affect local host populations, such as the degradation of the
environment, prostitution, petty theft and child labour. DFID can play a key role in
addressing some of these indirect security burdens, particularly providing safety nets
that prevent refugees from having to resort to negative coping mechanisms. DFID
should consider ways to provide prospects for refugees to lift themselves out of poverty
by building both local and refugee capacities through loans and income generating
projects. As argued in the UNHCR Standing Committee paper:
"Evidence suggests that focusing on the condition of the refugee, and removing
obstacles in the way of that person's productivity, are the most effective means
of dealing with refugee situations, in the absence of a durable solution. For
example, Liberian refugees who are free to cultivate land in Cote d'Ivoire, have
tumed swamps into rice fields. In Pakistan, Afghan refugees made such a
contribution in the carpet and transport sectors that their mass repatriation
impacted negatively on Peshawar's economy. And in Malawi in the 1980s,
Mozambican refugee farmers sold surplus produce to locals, and bequeathed
functioning farms upon their repatriation." (UNHCR,2004)
5.5. Towards a Full Response: Comprehensive Solutions to Protracted Refugee
Situations
Such directed interventions do not, however, provide a full response for the security
implications of refugee movements or protracted refugee situations. These interventions
can only help manage the situation until a resolution can be found; they cannot be a
substitute for a solution. In the long term, the security implications of forced migration
can only be fully addressed through the formulation and implementation of
comprehensive solutions for protracted refugee situations. Such a response would
employ the full range of possible solutions for refugees 
- 
repatriation and reintegration,
local integration in the host country, and resettlement to a third country.
DFID could play a significant role in each of these three solutions. For example, it could
support return and reintegration through local and regional post-conflict reconstruction
programmes, rehabilitation of former combatants, and incoming generation programmes
in support of demobilization.It could support local integration by politically engaging
host states to consider the options, by targeting assistance to refugee populated areas,
and by supporting self-sufficiency initiatives for locally integrated refugees. Finally,
DFID should encourage the consolidation and future development of the UK's fledgling
refugee resettlement programme.
In the past, comprehensive approaches and greater external engagement in regions of
refugee origin have proven to be the most effective way of resolving not only long-
standing refugee problems but sources of regional instability. The US and the
international community employed a broad range of policies to resolve refugee
situations of a protracted and seemingly insoluble nature in Europe in the 1960s for
displaced persons still in camps in Europe nearly 20 years after the Second World War
and from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s in Southeast Asia to deal with the protracted
Vietnamese refugee problem. (Loescher,2001: Chapters 4 and 8; UNHCR,2000) It is
likely that the potential benefits of a comprehensive approach applies with equal force
to the protracted refugee problems and conflicts in many regions of the world today.
(Loescher and Milner,2003:609 
- 
616)
There have been a number of recent policy initiatives by UNHCR, the EU and the UK
that attempt to address issues of forced migration, including protracted refugee
situations in a comprehensive manner. As Heaven Crawley's paper examines the UK's
proposals for in-region processing and the European Commission's initiatives on the
management of asylum and on durable solutions, we will focus on UNHCR's
Convention Plus and recent UK initiatives to address security concerns in Africa and
elsewhere.
Protracted refugee situations have been the principle targets of several major UNHCR
initiatives. such as Conventions Plus and the Framework for Durable Solutions.
Convention Plus provides the framework to implement special agreements, including
comprehensive plans of action (CPAs) that bring together a mix of durable solutions to
resolve complex refugee situations, including those that have significant security
implications such as protracted refugee situations. The Framework for Durable
Solutions also works to resolve long standing refugee problems and to unblock
impediments to responding to protracted refugee situations. It brings together three
initiatives developed in recent years: DAR (Development Assistance for Refugees), the
4Rs (repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction) and DLI
(Development through Local Integration). DAR and DLI emphasize refugee self-
reliance.
A good example of Convention Plus initiative to resolve and on-going protracted
refugee situation, including some of its security dimensions, is effort underway to try to
establish a CPA for Somali refugees. This initiative includes most (but not all) of the
major stakeholders including the Mogadishu government, host govemments in the
region, the European Commission, UNHCR and the cosponsors of the CPA, Denmark,
Netherlands and the UK. The steering group does not include Somaliland or Puntland.
With seed funding from the European Commission, the steering group intends to
develop a plan of action that it can eventually present to a special inter-governmental
meeting for approval and funding.
The effort to create a Somali refugee CPA is seen as a test case for Convention Plus. Its
objectives are to identify appropriate durable solutions for Somali refugees living in the
region's host countries. At present, given the continuing instability in southern and
central Somalia, the focus of the CPA is repatriation to Somaliland and Puntland where
conditions for returnees are more secure. In order for returns to be sustained there needs
to be increased emphasis on reintegration and post-conflict recovery. A focus of
Convention Plus is to open up possibilities for tapping into development funds to
provide stability in areas of return. However, funds for reintegration are limited and
donor appeals for Somali retums have been seriously under-subscribed. For example,
less than half of the $200 million for the Somalia repatriation appeal has been pledged
so far.
The second objective of the CPA is to examine how effective protection can be
achieved in host countries. A number of studies will be undertaken by local experts in
the region to determine the protection and assistance gaps that need to be addressed in
any future projects within the CPA. Finally, the European co-sponsors, Denmark,
Netherlands and the UK, are particularly interested in examining ways to mitigate
irregular movements of Somalis to the West.
While the plans to establish a Somali refugee CPA is a commendable effort to try to
engage the international community on a particularly difficult and complex protracted
refugee situation, it does not adequately link humanitarian, economic and political
approaches. Finding a solution for resolving the Somali protracted refugee situation
requires the restoration of a degree of stability and normality in southern and central
Somalia where the security situation has been unstable for more than the past decade.
The collapse of the central government in Mogadishu has provided opportunities for
radical Islam in the region. Numerous efforts to create a new, more stable govemment
there have failed and donor governments have come to perceive Somalia as a security
black hole.
The Somali refugee CPA underscores the need for a joined-up policy on the part of the
international community to address the long-standing security implications of protracted
refugee situations and humanitarian emergencies. The principal weakness of the Somali
refugee CPA is that it is not hitched to the on-going Somali peace negotiations that are
currently taking place in Nairobi. Past successful CPAs such as those in Indochina and
Central America in the 1980s and early 1990s relied on political initiatives that
preceded and laid the foundations for humanitarian and development programmes.
Without strong political support and successful peace negotiations there is little
immediate prospect of resolving protracted refugee situations such as the Somali
situation. Somalia needs a stable central government-one which requires some
external support in order for new political roots to take hold. This necessitates not only
inputs of humanitarian assistance but also security and peace keeping assistance aimed
at such activities as training and capacitating a new independent police force and army.
Such broad range responses also require the cooperation of a range of agencies and
states, and a range of actors within a state to address the security, development and
diplomatic aspects of comprehensive solutions. Despite the need for a multifaceted
approach to protracted refugee situations, however, the overall response of policy
makers remains compartmentalised with security, development and humanitarian issues
mostly being discussed in different forums, each with their own theoretical frameworks,
institutional arrangements, and independent policy approaches. (Castles et al., 2003)
There exists little or no strategic integration of approaches and little effective
coordination in the field.
One notable exception at the UK level is the joint DFID, FCO, Cabinet Office and MoD
Conflict Prevention Pools initiative. This programme was established by the UK to
integrate the policy making and programme delivery of these departments in order to
reduce both the number of conflicts around the world and the number of people affected
by war. A recent evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools (Austen, 2004) found that
this mechanism has led to increased inter-departmental collaboration and consensus on
conflict prevention policy in a number of regions. While this is a welcome development,
it should be noted that this effort does not specifically address the security implications
of protracted refugee situations nor does it address the considerable negative impact of
chronic and long-standing refugee populations on host state and regional security.
Another important initiative in which the UK government has been involved is recent
efforts to increase the capacity of African peacekeeping capabilities, particularly in
West Africa. Building up regional peacekeeping capabilities is an important part of the
Conflict Prevention Pools and DFID should continue to give priority to this. Conflict
prevention goes hand in hand with development initiatives to help restore stability in
war torn regions.
There also has been a dramatic increase in the number of UN peacekeeping operations
in Africa during the last year and a half. The UN Security Council has authorised new
missions in Liberia and Burundi and has strengthened existing ones in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. It is likely to authorise a large-scale mission to Sudan later this
year to support the implementation of a comprehensive peace accord designed to end
the twenty years long civil war there. These missions are overwhelmingly staffed by
troops from developing countries. All these missions are also so-called complex
peacekeeping operations, involving multiple tasks and combining military and civilian
components. (Berdal, 2004) Indeed, in May 2004, Kofi Annan outlined for the Security
Council the multidimensional tasks of today's peacekeeping missions: "Peacekeeping
today has become increasingly multidimensional. The missions you mandate are
implementing peace agreements, helping manage political transition, building
institutions, supporting economic reconstruction, organizing the return of refugees and
internally displaced persons, assisting humanitarian aid programmes, supervising or
even organizing elections, monitoring human rights, clearing minefields, disarming and
demobilizing militias, and reintegrating their members into the civilian economy." (tIN
Secretary General, 2004)
Neither the DPKO nor the under-resourced peacekeeping forces from developing
countries have adequate capacity (especially in logistics) to sustain this level of multiple
operations effectively. Therefore there is an urgent need for DFID along with other
stakeholders in the international system to address how the UN should respond to the
problems of state incapacity, including protracted refugee situations, and how to
empower regional bodies to assist in meeting this challenge.
Despite all the rhetoric to the contrary, neither the UN nor governments have adequately
integrated the resolution of recurring regional refugee problems with economic and
security issues. International involvement in nation-building, reconstruction, and
rehabilitation in war-torn regions is still piecemeal and under-resourced. Consequently,
there is a pressing need to develop a policy agenda that extends beyond conventional
boundaries and seeks to integrate the resolution of chronic and recurring regional
refugee problems with economic development and security issues. It is clear that DFID
along with its sister agencies must be engaged in these discussions.
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